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Abstract 
 
Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) is the ranking of good corporate governance by Indonesian 
Institute for Corporate Governance (IICG) with SWA magazine. Companies that follow the CGPI survey showed 
a willingness to become a trusted and open. This effort should be perceived positively by stakeholders. Some 
previous researches showed that a corporate governance has a significant impact on the lowering the cost of debt 
(Piot & Piera 2007; Sengupta & Bhojraj 2003; Ashbaugh & Skaife et al 2006). Therefore, this paper is aimed to 
search the benefit of GCG implementation to the cost of debt.  All companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) which have a GCG score for survey period  2004-2009 are selected as a research sample. Other 
variables such as Debt to Asset (DA), Return on Asset (ROA), Sales Growth (Sgrowth), Firm Size (Fsize and 
Market to Book (MTB) are considered as control variables. The results do not support the hypothesis. Several 
explanations, including the low level of creditor’s confidence to the good corporate governance practices have 
been discussed to support the research findings.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The implementation of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) can be indicated by applying of GCG’s principles, 
such as transparency, accountability, responsibility, fairness and independency. GCG  emphasizes on stakeholder 
right to get precise, transparent and  timely information about company’s performance and ownership (Sulistyanto 
& Meniek, 2003).  
 
The role of GCG’s principles  to the cost of debt (CoD) have been searched by Chen & Jian (2007), the 
conclusion is transparency in providing information will diminish  default risk  and  finally reduce the CoD.  Piot 
& Piera (2007) searched the affect of GCG and audit quality toward CoD, the result showed that there is a 
significant affect of GCG to the CoD. Rinaningsih (2009) also proved that GCG and Bond rating have significant 
association.  Prior them,  Sengupta & Bhojraj (2003) have iniated  to research affect of GCG  to the Bond Rating 
using  1005 Bonds issued between  1991-1996. The results showed that companies which implement GCG 
enjoyed higher bond rating.    
 
To promote implementation of GCG, Government of Indonesia (GoI) through Indonesia Institute of Corporate 
Governance (IICG) has iniated  to rank  the level of GCG implementation (Suprayitno et al. 2005). Regularly, 
since 2001, IICG conducted research to evaluate GCG practices by companies. The ranking was namely 
Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI). There are ten aspects of GCG which assessed   i.e  (1) the 
company’s commitment on GCG, (2) transparency, (3) accountability, (4) responsibilities, (5) independency, (6) 
fairness, (7) competence,  (8) mission statement, (9) leadership and (10) staff colaboration.   
 
Scoring of the ten aspects then categorize into 3 level i.e highly  trusted (score 85.00-100.00), trusted  (score 
70.00-84.99) and adequate trusted (55.00-69.99). Number of CGPI’s participant since 2001 is presented in figure 
1.  
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According to  Miharjo (2008), GCG implementation is costly  since companies  are required to have  independent 
commisioner, audit committee,   tranparent  accounting information system etc. Besides that, companies’ 
participation in the CGPI research will a
participation in the CGPI research will 
lower cost of capital, efficient and effective resources allocation which finally  
value.  
 
However, figure 1 shows that the participation
Binhaldi highlights three main factors explain the drop of CGPI 
marketing of CGPI events, (2) a number of
some companies have realized the potential benefits 
benefits derived through achieving the level 
  
It is interesting to investigate whether  
research support that some benefits exist, but the decreasing of participant in GCG survey on the other hand imply 
that the benefit still questionable. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
 
CoD is the return that must be received by the creditor
(2003) calculate CoD using the bond yield of  a company, while Fortin and Pittman (2003) using the ratio of 
interest expense to average interest bearing 
then the study will measure CoD using  interest expense.
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 Type	equation	here
 
Interest expense can be obtained from the company's income statement (Br
obtained by analyzing financial statements liabilities that contributed to the interest expense. Average Interest 
Bearing Debt is obtained from the average Interest Bea
 
Default risk is considered in the credit approval. One of the determinant variables in assessing default risk is GCG 
score due to it represents the performance of GCG implementation. Company  which has a high  GCG score 
seen as a trusted company and assessed as  a low default risk company. It will lead creditors to charge a low 
return from  the company. 
 
Blom & Schauten (2006) investigated the relationship between GCG and CoD using 300 samples from 
Eurotop 300. Bond yield is used to measure the CoD. The results showed that the better the GCG performance 
then the lower the CoD.  
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Figure 1. CGPI Participant 
 
dd management’s tasks. Therefore managements expect
offer some gains such as increasing investor and creditor confidence, 
 lead to 
 of the companies in the CGPI research 
participation: (1) the lack of promotion
 companies do not feel confidence with their GCG implementation
of GCG implementation but it is not worth
of CGPI. (SWA Magazine No 26/XXII/11) 
the  benefit of implementing GCG really exist. Although some previous 
s on their loan (Fabozzi, 2007).  Bhojraj and Sengupta 
debt. Because not many companies in Indonesia that issued bonds, 
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Anderson et.al (2003) also supported that CoD has a negative correlation with GCG practice. In their research, 
GCG practice was showed  by  the existence of independent board of commissioner, number of board 
commissioner and audit committee structure. GCG practices which assessed by authoritative party provide the 
creditor the assurance that the companies do not hide material information that potentially mislead in decision 
making. Then, companies  which have good rating of their GCG practice will enjoy lower CoD.  Therefore the 
hypothesis  1 proposed  is :  
H1: GCG score has a negative influence to the CoD.  
 
According to previous researches, there are many other variables that affect CoD rate. Chen & Jian (2006) 
showed that debt to assets ratio  (D/A) affect the CoD. The composition of  debt to asset shows company assets 
protection to its creditor. The higher the debt to asset ratio, the higher  the creditor claim to company’s asset. 
Therefore, it will  trigger potential conflict of interest between company and creditor (Ahmed, Billings, Morton, 
and  Stanford & Harris, 2002).  From the creditors’view, the higher D/A the higher the risk of the company, thus 
creditor will charge the higher CoD to compensate the risk.  Anderson et.al (2003), using D/A as a control 
variable also  found  that there was a positive relationship between D/A and CoD. Using D/A as a control 
variable, the hypothesis 2, is proposed below :  
H2 : D/A has a positive influence to the CoD  
 
Low CoD rate will also be enjoyed by companies that have high return on assets  (ROA) ratio. Since ROA 
indicate  the capality of companies to create return from their assets, thus higher ROA means good performance 
of companies’operation. Creditor will appreciate company with higher ROA with  lower CoD rate. Therefore 
ROA have a negative correlation to the  CoD. This is supported by  the research result of  Chen  & Jian (2006), 
Piot and  Piera (2007) which prove that  ROA have a negative affect to the CoD. Therefore hypothesis 3, is 
proposed as follow :   
 H3 : ROA has a negative affect to the  CoD. 
 
Firms with more growth opportunities  will have lower leverage as the agency costs associated with the 
debtholder–stockholder conflict is likely to be a positive function for such firm  (Kim & Lyn, 1986).  According 
to (Myers, 1977), companies having better growth opportunities will have a tendency to finance their business 
with equity rather than debt. Using sales growth as a measurement of growth (Chen & Jian  2006), then  the 
following hypothesis is proposed :  
H4 : Sales growth  has a negative affect to the  CoD 
 
Bhojraj & Sengupta (2003) suggest that big firms will obtain lower bond yield and higher bond rating due to their 
low market risk.  Besides that, big firms have more resources to produce   information disclosure  that is more 
attractive to media and analyst  (Chen & Jian 2006), since the company become more transparent than others.  
One of the firm size measurement is asset total.  Company’s asset owned shows the company’ability to repay its 
loan, thus credit risk for such a company should be low (Pittman & Fortin 2003).  Anderson et al. (2003) proved 
that  firm size  has a negative correlation to CoD.  Chen & Jian (2006), Piot & Piera (2007)  also proved the same 
result. Therefore hipotheses 5 is proposed as follow:  
H5 : Firm size has a negative affect  to  CoD. 
 
Binsbergen, Graham  & Yang (2010) found that firms with growth opportunities  that is  low market-to-book  
(MTB) on average face a higher cost of debt.  According to Myers (1977), growth firms have a higher cost of debt 
due to they use their assets to growth.  On the other  hand, debt  forcing  firms to comply covenant otherwise 
penalty will be imposed, this  potentially resctricts the firms to  exercise their assets to invest and growth. 
According to previous  researches,  hypothesis 6 is proposed as follow: 
H6 : Market to book ratio a positive affect  to  CoD 
 
3. Research  Methods 
 
To depict the relationship among variables to be tested, model analysis is presented in figure 2. To anticipate the 
effect of crisis period during 2007-2008, year of crisis added  as a dummy variable in the following model.  
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Figure 2. Model Analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression equation  formulated to test the hypothesis is as follow: 
CoD = β0 + β1 GCG + β2 ROA + β3 DA + β4 SGrowth + β5 MTB +  
 β6 FSize + β7 Y8 + µ             (1) 
whereas  :  
CoD  : Cost of Debt 
β0  : constant 
β1,2,3,4,5,6,7 : regression coefficient of each variable 
GCG  : GCG Score 
ROA  : Return on Asset 
DA  : Debt to asset ratio 
SGrowth : Sales Growth 
MTB  : Market to Book Ratio 
FSize  : Firm Size 
Y8  : Year of crisis (2007-2008) 
µ  : Error term  
 
Operationalization of each of  variables is summarized in table 1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GCG Score  
 
1. Return on Asset (ROA) 
2. Debt to asset ratio (DA) 
3. Sales Growth Ratio 
(SGrowth) 
4. Market to Book Ratio 
(MTB) 
5. Firm Size Ratio (FSize) 
6. Year of crisis (Y8) 
COD 
 
Independent variable 
Control variables 
Dependent 
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Table 1 : Operationalisation of Variables 
 
Symbol Variables Definition  
CoD Cost of Debt  !"!# 	$%&!#!
'(!")*!	 !"# 	+!)",*		-. !
  (1) 
 
GCG Good Corporate Governance Score of GCG of each company 
(CGPI Index)  based on IICG and 
SWA survey 
ROA Return on Asset Net income divided by  total assets 
DA Debt to asset ratio  Total debt divided by total asset 
SGrowth Sales Growth  Dirrefence of revenue year t  
toward  revenue year t-1 divided 
by revenue year t 
MTB Market to Book  Ratio  Market value of equity divided by 
book balue of equity  
FSize  Firm size  Log of total asset 
Y8 Dummy variable for the year 
of crisis (2007-2008) 
One  if data in the  year  of crisis 
(2007-2008) otherwise 2007-2008 
equals zero 
 
Accordance with the objective of this research, the sample  used in this research limited to companies which 
participate in CGPI survey. Thus, these companies are as a unit analysis in this research.  Purposive sampling 
technique is applied in this research. Sample is selected  based on  the following   criteria : (1) participate in CGPI 
survey for the period 2004-2008, (2) has a thorough annual report for the priod 2005-2009, (3) not a banking  or  
financial institution company, (4) publish GCG score. 
 
4. Results  and  Discussions 
 
There are 118 companies which participate in CGPI survey for the period 2004-2008 but remaining  38 
companies meet with  the sample criteria. Thoroughly selection process is  presented in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Sample Selection Process 
 
Selection Criteria Total 
Number of companies participate in CGPI 
survey during  2004-2008 
118 
Less: bank and financial institution 
companies  
(31) 
Less: companies that do not have the 
complete  annual report  
(26) 
Less: companies that do not publish  GCG 
score 
(23) 
Total sample  38 
 
Profile of  research variables is shown in table 3. The average sample has a relatively high GCG score of 75.46, 
can be classified as ‘trusted’. Maximum cost of debt is 15.8 % with average 10.62% , this rate is quite competitive 
compared with 7.08%  ROA . On average,  sample firms  have a quite homogen size as shown by a narrow range 
between the minimum and maximum value of each variable. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before testing hypothesis,  data need to be tested  whether  it  meet with the classical assumption or not. With a 
confidence level of 5%,  model meets the normality test,  autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and multicolinierity. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov is used to test normality. The residual value is 0.974 greater than 0.05, it means that data 
are normally distributed. Heteroskedasticity test using the White test. Due to the probability of Obs*R-squared is 
0.6203 (exceeding 0.05), it can be concluded that heteroskedasticity problem does not exist. Autocorrelation test 
is performed by the method of Breusch-Godfrey. Result  the probability of Obs * R-squared is 0.2985 (exceeding 
0.05), it can be concluded that there was no autocorrelation problem. Multicollinearity test can be seen from the 
VIF value. VIF value for all independent variables data below 10 and tolerance values above 0.1 means that all 
variables are free from multicollinearity. Tables containing the classical assumption test results are presented in 
annex 1. 
 
Model summary with  R value of  0.571 shows a fairly strong relationship of  CoD with  all indepennt variables. 
While R square is 0.326 means that  32.6%  of change in CoD can be explained by GCG Score, ROA, D/A, 
SGrowth, FSize, MTB,  and Y8, as shown in table 4. But the significance of independent variables in explaining 
the change of independent variable is not good enough, because the value of F sig is  0.078  greater than 0.05 (see 
table 5), however this model is still quite fit on the significance of 10%.  
 
Table 4. R Value, R Square, SEE 
 
Table 5. F Test and Significance   
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Results of regression test as presented in table
Table 6. 
The significance value of  GCG score is 0.335  greater than 0.05 means that there is  no significant affect of GCG 
score to the CoD.  The result do not support hyp
Blom & Schauten  (2006) also  Anderson et.al  (2003). 
 
Figure
 
The research sample data, as presented in figure
pattern with the raising and falling  of GCG score. It seem that  creditors ignore the  company’s GCG score in 
determining cost of debt. GCG score is not credible enough to creditor to justify
company which actively involved in GCG survey do not guarantee to be free from default. Bakrie Group for 
example, as one of the active participant in GCG survey,  surprisingly had defaulted on their loans. It has been 
decreased the credibility of the GCG score as a repres
 
As a new practice to evaluate GCG implementation, the GCG survey is still need times to prove as a credible 
indicator to be considered in assessing company risk. 
yet, thefore the number of participant tend to be decline from year to year.  This raises further doubt of creditor to 
use GCG score  as one of the indicators in assessing the required return.  Moreove
that although the company has good corporate governance, it does  not  guarantee high debt ratings due to  there 
are other factors outside of corporate governance should be considered, such as political factors, industry risk,
company's position in the economy, including the market sentiment and rumors.
 
                     Vol. 3 No. 18 [Special Issue 
 6 below is used to test  each hypothesis.
 
 Constant, Coefficients, T Test and Sig 
othesis 1 and contrarary with some previous research results by 
 
 3.  Profile of GCG and  COD 
 
 3 show that the  increasing or decreasing  of CoD has no similar 
 the company’s risk. The fact that 
entative tool to evaluate company risk.  
The participation in GCG survey has not been mandatory 
r, Setyaningrum (2005) stated 
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Further, the result of testing  hypothesis 2  
significantly affect to the COD. It is contrary 
and  Piera (2007). Mahadwartha & Ismiyanti (2007) insist that creditor perceives fixed assets as a collateral not 
share of claim with investors, therefore D/A is not a significant variable. The result
which stated that ROA, SGrowth have a significant affect to the CoD are also not proven. Bharath (2008) states 
that lending to the old lender  usually require lower security (collateral) than collateral to the new lender, th
produce a more favorable loan agreements for the company. It imply that creditor pay more attention on the 
lender’s credit history rather than just financial ratio such as  D / A, ROA, and SGrowth in determining required 
return.  
 
Contrary with the results of  hypothesis testing  toward  the financial ratio, Fsize on the other side proves the 
negative significant affect to the CoD. Therefore hypothesis 5 is accepted. This result is consistent with Anderson 
et al. (2003), Chen & Jian (2006), and Piot
amount of assets or big company. This company is perceived more open in providing information than  small 
company.  It will reduce information assymetri  and reduce risk. Creditor will exp
company. 
 
Market to Book has significant affect to the CoD  as  hypothesized in hypothesis 6, however the result do not 
support this hypothesis. This is inconsistent with the previous  research (Chen 
market to book has no information content to the creditor in assessing company’s risk. Creditors 
confidence that market is representation of firm performance. There are many factors outside company controls 
influence market value of book assets. That is why creditors do not rely on their decision on the market to book 
assets.    
 
To prove the impact year of crisis to CoD, this research use year of crisis (Y8) as a dummy variable. The 
hypothesis testing do not confirm the significance relationship of year of crisis to the CoD.  Apparently the 
creditor is not affected by the crisis situation in requiring return. Therefore hypothesis 7 is rejected.  Research 
sample data also shows that interest expense is relatively stabl
The short-term period of crisis may be deemed quite safe by creditor not to raise their required return.  Beside that  
cost of debt has already been contained in debt covenant and valid for certain pe
 
5. Conclusion  and  Limitation 
 
This research cannot prove the existing relationship of GCG implementation proxied by GCG score to the CoD. 
However it is too early to conclude that there is no benefit of GCG implementation to companies. 
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is also do not supported. The result shows that D/A 
with the previous results as evidenced by  Chen & Jian (2006), 
s of testing hypothesis 3 and 4 
 & Piera (2007). Creditor tend to trust a company that owns a large 
ect low return for such 
& Jian 2006). It seems that ratio 
e during the period of crisis as indicated in figure
riod.  
Figure 4. Cost of Debt Profile 
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Some explanations are as follows,  firstly, GCG survey is  new practice therefore need more  time to make users 
convince with the result. Secondly, the GCG survey is not mandatory, only a few companies participate in this 
survey. Thirdly, Some companies still can not see the benefit to participate in the GCG survey even costly. While 
the fourth and the fith explanations  are  there is no guarantee that firm with high GCG score is free from default 
risk, and aspects used to measure GCG implementation are  still vary, it make companies and users (creditors) 
confuse with its  results. 
 
Further, the results of  variable control testing show that only Fsize has a strong affect to the CoD, while other 
five variables such as D/A, ROA, SGrowth MTB, Y8 have no affect to the CoD. However all the variables have 
the explanation value in changes of CoD, using 10% confidence level.  
 
Since GCG score is one of the proxies of GCG implementation, it give an opportunity for future research to use 
another measurement of GCG implementation, so the robustness problem in this current research could be fixed. 
Extended the sample period is  also another opportunity for future research to improve the current result and to 
closeness the results with the real fact.  
 
6.
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